This paper examines the links between asset price movements and fiscal policy developments. Our findings suggest that fiscal policy makers have been responding to asset price movements as indicated by fiscal policy reaction functions. Nevertheless, while asset price movements contribute to fiscal consolidation, they do not necessarily lead to sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances. Nonetheless, fiscal policy makers should take into account asset price movements because they amplify the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy stance, which can be harmful to economic activity. Finally, in view of the increased asset price volatility and the reduced correlation of economic and asset price cycles over the recent years there is a case for responding to asset price movements and for adjusting fiscal balances for asset price changes.
Introduction
In the context of the current macroeconomic and financial market turmoil fiscal policy making has been at the forefront. The December 2008 European Council decided to undertake a significant fiscal impulse to boost economic activity in the EU; analogous expansionary fiscal actions had already been initiated by the US administration and other countries around the globe. These actions involve both discretionary demand boosting measures, as well as measures to restore financial stability in the banking sector involving equity injections, subsidies, asset purchases, loan guarantees etc. Moreover, monetary authorities around the world, in response to the crisis, have engaged in an unprecedented monetary easing.
The latest economic and financial market developments go hand in hand with a significant fall in asset prices, which in several asset classes and countries resemble the case of an asset price bust, following several years of asset price boom (e.g., house price developments in Ireland, the UK, Spain and the US). While there has been an extensive literature on the appropriate monetary policy making in response to asset price movement (e.g., see Borio and Lowe, 2002; Detken and Smetts, 2004; Miskin and White, 2003; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002a, 2002b) , the literature on the appropriate fiscal policy response is far less developed. In addition, there is only limited evidence as to whether discretionary fiscal policy has been responding to or affected by asset prices changes.
A series of recent contributions investigate the effects that asset price movements have on fiscal balances. These were motivated by the asset price boom of the late 1990s and the windfall revenues it generated, which were then deemed as being of a structural nature leading to permanent improvement in fiscal positions. However, the subsequent burst of the asset price bubble led to a significant deterioration of fiscal balances, hindering the sustainability of fiscal positions and limiting the budgetary room for maneuver during the downturn of the early 2000s. Therefore, most 2 contributions focus on whether government revenues should be adjusted both for the economic and the asset price cycle.
For example, Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) , focusing on three asset classes -equities, residential property and commercial property -examine the effect of boom and bust phases in asset prices on fiscal policy behavior. After identifying boom and bust phases in asset prices, they examine whether these coincide with output gap and output growth developments. They found that (i) expansions and contractions in economic activity during such boom-bust phases in asset prices tend to be highly persistent, (ii) conventional estimates of tax elasticities are not accurate, leading to a biased assessment of the fiscal stance and the underlying fiscal position in boom-bust phases, (iii) boom-bust phases exacerbate existing pro-cyclical policy biases, and political economy biases toward higher spending and public debt ratios.
On the other hand, Morris and Schucknecht (2007) investigate the impact that asset prices have on fiscal revenues. They estimate short and long run revenue elasticities with respect to equity and real estate price indices for 16 OECD countries. For a subsample of euro area countries, they use these elasticities to investigate the impact of asset prices on budget balances and the assessment of the fiscal stance by adjusting existing estimates of cyclically adjusted balances for the asset price "cycle". Asset prices changes are found to be a major factor behind unexplained changes in cyclically adjusted balance. Tujula and Wolswijk (2004) investigate what determines overall, non-cyclically adjusted, fiscal balances in 22 OECD countries. The empirical analysis shows that asset prices (housing and equity prices) affect budgetary outcomes, but their effect is limited in normal times. Eschenbanch and Schuknecht (2002) examine econometrically the effect of asset prices on fiscal balances via the revenue channels, i.e. via direct, indirect and capital turnover taxes. They find that a 10% change in stock and real estate prices affects the fiscal balance by on average 0.4% of GDP in most industrialized OECD countries with values ranging from 0.1% to 0.8% of GDP depending on the country. Schuknecht and Eschenbanch (2004) investigate the effect that asset prices have on fiscal balances via expenditure and government financial activities by focusing on specific countries (UK and Sweden) that have experienced strong asset price fluctuations, financial instability and government bailouts. They conclude that financial instability increases the variability of fiscal balances. Sweden and the UK experienced in the late 1980s-early 1990s a dramatic deterioration in fiscal balances by 9% and 16%, respectively, according to Schuknect and Eschenbanch (2004) 40-50% of this deterioration was due to asset price and financial instability related effects on revenues and financial sector bail-out costs. Moreover, the authors report that financial instability led to significant debt ratio increases in six industrialized countries (Sweden, Finland, Japan, France, UK, Switzerland) ranging from 11 to 50% of GDP.
The present paper is building on these earlier contributions and investigates the links between asset price movements and fiscal policy developments. Moreover, we try to ascertain the extent to which fiscal policy makers have been taking on board or responding to asset price changes. The current paper goes beyond the aforementioned studies in that it investigates three aspects of the effects of asset prices not considered before. First, we investigate, by estimating fiscal policy reaction functions as in Gali and Perotti (2003) , whether there is any evidence that fiscal policy makers have been responding to asset price changes. Second, given that asset prices are particularly volatile, we examine whether this amplifies the volatility of fiscal policy outcomes, which according to Fatas and Mihov (2003) has negative repercussions on output volatility and economic growth. Building on earlier work, e.g., Tavares (2004) and Ardagna (2004) , and given that fiscal policy outcomes are affected by asset prices, we investigate whether asset prices movements have any effect on the probability to initiate and to successfully conclude a fiscal adjustment effort.
Our findings suggest that fiscal policy makers have been responding to asset price movements as indicated by fiscal policy reaction functions. However, while asset price movements contribute to fiscal consolidation, they do not necessarily lead to successful fiscal consolidation episodes. Nevertheless, fiscal policy makers should take into account asset price movements because they amplify the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy stance. In addition, in view of the increased asset price volatility and the reduced correlation of economic and asset price cycles over the recent years there is a case for taking into account and responding to asset price movements and for adjusting fiscal balances, and in particular government revenues, for asset price changes.
Section 2 discusses the potential channels of interaction between asset price changes and budgetary outcomes. Section 3 analyzes the behaviour of fiscal policy makers by estimating fiscal policy reaction functions. Section 4 investigates whether asset price volatility amplifies the volatility of the fiscal policy stance. In Section 5 we examine the links between fiscal adjustments and asset prices changes. The last section summarizes the main findings and concludes.
Asset prices and interactions with budgetary outcomes
As has been discussed by relevant literature, e.g., Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) and Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2004) , asset prices can affect the budget via a series of channels. Directly via certain revenue categories, e.g., capital gains/losses related taxes. These affect direct taxes on households and corporations. Moreover, the government raises revenues via transactions in assets, the so-called turnover taxes. Indirectly, via a feedback loop from asset prices to the real economy; higher asset prices raise consumer confidence and consumption, via the wealth effect, and increase the collection of indirect taxes. Finally, in case of asset price busts and ailing financial institutions the state might be asked to intervene baring some of the costs. The government's intervention to bailout financial institutions affects public finances via several channels. In case they take the form of budgetary subsidies or expenditures they directly affect the budget deficit. However, if they take the form of financial transactions, e.g., purchase of assets or equity injections they will affect only the debt ratio. Moreover, in case of guarantees extended to the private sector, the government will be burdened only at the time that the guarantees on loans are called up. Last but not least, there is an additional indirect channel, i.e., if the asset price bust leads to financial instability and induces a negative feedback loop on economic activity the government might have to undertake expansionary fiscal measures to avert the danger of a full blown economic recession, leading, thus, to the deterioration of its budgetary position.
Following previous studies, e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) , Detken and Smetts (2004) , Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) our asset price indicators are taken from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The main indicator is a measure of annual aggregate real asset prices, which covers 1970-2005 for 17 industrial countries and combines price indices for three asset classes -equities, residential property and commercial property -by weighting the components using shares of the asset classes in private sector wealth. The private consumption deflator is used to convert nominal to real asset prices. In addition, we consider also the three disaggregated asset price indicators, i.e., real commercial prices, real residential prices and real equity prices.
Fiscal policy reaction functions and asset price changes
In this section we estimate standard fiscal policy reaction functions augmented with asset price variables. This way we explore whether asset price swings have influenced the fiscal policy stance, as well as whether they have been taken into account by policy makers in their effort to stabilize the economy.
First, we investigate econometrically whether asset price movements above or below trend can modify the policy makers' response to the cycle. To this end, we extract by means of an HP filter (where lambda is set to 1000 as in Detken and Smets, 2004 ) the cyclical component of asset prices series. We construct a dummy variable taking value 1 when the cyclical component is positive and 0 when it is negative; this is then multiplied with the output gap. Hence, we can investigate whether the effect of the output gap on the change of the cyclically adjusted primary balance differs in cases where assets prices are above or below trend.
As a benchmark, we present the relevant regressions without taking into account the asset price movements (Table 1) . Analogous fiscal reactions functions have been estimated by the European Commission (2006) and Perotti and Gali (2004) . These resemble backward looking fiscal rules for the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (DCAPBY), the change in the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP (DCATDXY), and the change in the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a percent of GDP (DCATRY). They are backward looking in the sense that we proxy the response to the cycle with the lagged value of the output gap. We include in the regression a series of variables which have been found relevant by previous studies and are likely to be taken on board by the policy maker when designing his/her optimal response. These are the lagged value of the real effective exchange rate (Reer), the lagged value of the short term interest rate (RIRS), and the initial budgetary and debt conditions. Note that in the case of the spending and revenue reaction functions we control, respectively, for the initial spending and revenue developments, in order to capture the objective of restructuring each respective part of the budget (i.e., the higher the starting revenue/GDP ratio or expenditure/GDP ratio, the more likely for revenues of expenditures to be cut in the following year).
In Table 2 we take on board the asset price movements. Fiscal policy is conducted in a countercyclical manner as suggested by the positive output gap coefficient (see column 1 in Tables 1 and 2 ), i.e., when the output gap increases the government increases the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) or cuts its deficit. As is shown in Table 2 (column 1) the effect of the output gap on the policy makers' fiscal response is significant only when asset prices are below trend. However, relevant Chi-square tests indicate that there is no statistically significant asymmetry as regards the magnitude of the response to the cycle when asset prices are above or below trend. Both government spending and revenue increase when economic activity improves, i.e., when the output gap increases (Table 1, columns 2 and 3) . This implies that the government revenue and spending respond in a pro-cyclical manner. Analogous findings are reported in Table 2 (columns 2 and 3) . Moreover, there is some small evidence that revenues respond asymmetrically to the output gap (but only at the 15% level of significance), i.e., more strongly when the asset prices are above rather than below trend. Therefore, when asset prices move above trend, the cyclically adjusted tax revenues increase at a faster pace, implying that revenue elasticities that do not adjust for the effect of asset price movements might underestimate the effect of the cycle or overestimate the discretionary response of the policy maker.
[ Tables 1 and 2 around here]
Fiscal policy stance
Next we augment fiscal policy reaction functions of the type estimated by Gali and Perotti (2003) and the European Commission (2006) with asset prices. Given that the effect of asset prices on fiscal balances is not netted out, we investigate what has been, if any, the policy makers' response on asset price changes (or whether asset prices affect discretionary fiscal policy measures), as well as whether this response differs depending on the sign of asset price change. First, we start by focusing on the change of the aggregate real asset price index (DLRAAP), and then we consider simultaneously its three components, real commercial prices (DLRCP), real residential prices (DLRRP) and real equity prices (DLREP).
Starting from a standard backward looking fiscal rule augmented with real aggregate asset prices (Table 3 , column 1), we see that a pick up in asset prices leads to a higher cyclically adjusted primary balance. This is a counter-cyclical type of response, in the sense that the additional revenues that might be generated are saved and are translated into higher surplus (or lower deficit). However, as we see in column 2 (Table 3) , the policy makers' response depends on the asset price change considered. An increase in asset prices, when they are positive, generates a positive but insignificant response on fiscal balances. On the contrary, an increase in asset prices when they are in negative territory, leads to a significant improvement in fiscal balances. Alternatively, a further fall in asset prices (when already in negative territory) leads to a dramatic deterioration in fiscal balances (in cyclically adjusted terms). This asymmetric response is also supported by the Chi-square tests presented in Table 3 . Analogous findings are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 , where we consider forward looking type of fiscal rules, with the output gap being instrumented by its first and second lagged value.
In Table 4 we report the findings when employing the three disaggregated asset price series. The findings are consistent with those presented in Table 3 , i.e., fiscal balances respond positively to an increase in the three asset price series. Nevertheless, only the effect of real residential prices appears to be significant.
[ Tables 3 and 4 around here] Table 5 reports the findings on the government spending rules. Both in the case of the backward and the forward looking rules (columns 1 and 3) an increase (a fall) in asset prices leads to lower (higher) cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments. This implies that while government spending responds pro-cyclically to economic activity (positive coefficient on output gap), it responds counter-cyclically to asset price movements. This might reflect the fact that policy makers are aware that asset prices movements are frequent and abrupt. Hence, the extra revenues that might be generated (if any) are not deemed permanent and the policy maker takes action in order to improve the cyclically adjusted primary balance on the expenditure side. Alternatively, as has been shown by Schuknecht and Eschenbach (2004) abrupt asset price movements (busts) linked with financial instability can lead to higher government spending. This will be the case when the government has to bear part of the burden of a private sector bailout or when it wants to take discretionary action in order to avert a negative feedback loop on economic activity which could lead to a full blown recession.
Government spending
There is evidence of asymmetry in the response of the fiscal policy makers depending on the sign of the asset price change (Table 5 , columns 2 and 4). An increase in asset prices, when asset price are positive, generates a negative but insignificant response on government spending. On the contrary, an increase in asset prices when they are in negative territory, leads to a significant fall in government spending. Alternatively, a further fall in asset prices (when they are already falling) leads to a sharp increase in government spending, possibly due to measures to restore the stability of the financial system or government interventions to avert that an asset price bust will impact negatively on economic activity. This asymmetric response is supported by the relevant Chi-square tests reported in Table 5 .
The findings on the three disaggregated asset price series reported in Table 6 are consistent with those on the aggregate asset price series. Asset price increases induce a negative, but insignificant, response on the part of government spending.
[ Tables 5 and 6 around here]
Government revenue
Turning to government revenue fiscal rules, (Table 7 , columns 1 and 3) we see that an increase in asset prices has a negative, but insignificant, effect on cyclically adjusted total revenues. Although government revenue respond pro-cyclically to economic activity (positive coefficient on output gap), they appear to be unresponsive or to respond in an insignificant and counter-cyclically manner in asset price hikes. Moreover, as we see in Table 7 (columns 2 and 4) there is no evidence of asymmetry in the response of the fiscal policy maker depending on the sign of asset price movements.
The findings on the disaggregated asset price series reported in Table 8 indicate that government revenues, in most cases, respond negatively and insignificantly (with the exception of real commercial prices) to asset price changes. Despite what one might have expected, asset price increases do not translate into higher cyclically adjusted or structural revenues. One possible explanation is that the economic and the asset price cycles move closely together, hence, there is no additional cyclical effect from asset prices left on cyclically adjusted revenues. According to the correlation coefficients reported in Table 9 (see figures in bold), there is some evidence that asset price movements move closely together with economic activity, in particular when considering the growth rate of real GDP.
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 around here]
Main findings
Overall, based on the evidence reported in Tables 1-8 , we see that an increase (a fall) in asset prices affects in a positive (negative) and significant manner cyclically adjusted primary balances. However, this is mainly driven by the expenditure side developments, i.e., higher (lower) asset prices lead to lower (higher) spending in cyclically adjusted terms, whereas revenues respond negatively and insignificantly. Hence, it is not windfall revenues due to asset price movements that improve cyclically adjusted fiscal balances, but rather the policy makers' discretionary decision to cut spending. Any positive effect of asset price changes on tax revenues has no effect on cyclically adjusted revenues, and thus does not improve fiscal balances in structural terms; instead, this improvement comes from the expenditure side. Alternatively, in response to a rapid fall in asset prices the policy makers increase government spending in order to counterbalance the effects of falling asset prices on economic activity and, possibly, to address the vulnerabilities of the financial system.
Financial liberalization
It is widely acknowledged that in the 1980-90s there has been a surge in financial development across OECD countries. It might be the case that the effect of asset price movements on fiscal balances has changed over the course of the years or that fiscal policy makers respond in a different manner. To investigate this we proceed by splitting the sample and running separate regressions for the periods 1970-1992 and 1993-2005 . The split date is chosen in order to have about the same data points in the two sub-samples, given that we employ an unbalanced panel data set. Moreover, the effects of financial liberalization and the development of new and complex financial instruments which are based on different asset classes are more visible since the 1990s.
Tables 10-13 report the findings on the fiscal policy reaction functions over the two periods. These are comparable to the results shown in Tables 3 and 4. As in the whole sample case fiscal balances respond in a positive and significant manner (only in columns 1 and 2) to asset price movements (Table 10) . Note, however, that the magnitude of the response in the first sub-sample is much more pronounced. Moreover, there is no statistically significant evidence of asymmetry depending on whether asset prices movements are positive or negative. At a disaggregated level, asset prices movements are of limited statistical significance, and at times have opposite sign (Table 11 ).
In the period 1993-2005, asset price changes have limited and insignificant effects on the fiscal policy stance (Table 12 ). The same applies when examining the disaggregated asset price effects (Table 13 ). However, in this case real commercial prices have a negative and significant effect on fiscal balances. Moreover, the pattern of responses has changed, i.e., in the period 1970-1992 real commercial and real residential prices improve fiscal balances, whereas in the period 1993-2005 they generate the opposite effect. On the other hand, real equity prices have a positive effect on fiscal balances in the second period and a negative one in the first (but the coefficient estimates are insignificant in most cases). The findings on government spending rules indicate that, in the period 1970-1992, an increase in aggregate asset prices has a quite pronounced negative effect on government spending (Tables 14) . Moreover, this response appears particularly significant in the case of real commercial and real equity prices (Table 15 ). In the period 1993-2005 the response of government spending is still negative but much weaker and highly insignificant (Table 16) . At a disaggregated level the effect of real commercial and real residential prices switches sign, however, only real commercial prices have a statistically significant coefficient estimate (Table 17) . In the case of government revenue reaction functions, as in the whole sample case, aggregate asset price movements have a negative and insignificant coefficient estimate in the period (Table 18 ). Nonetheless, it appears that there is some limited evidence of asymmetry in the response of government revenues. When asset prices increase (from a negative territory), government revenues fall, or when asset prices decline rapidly (when already negative), the policy makers take action to increase government revenues. At a disaggregated level (Table 19) , the negative effect of asset prices appears particularly significant in the cases of real commercial and real equity prices. In the period 1993-2005 (Table 20) , the effect of asset prices on government revenues has switched sign, i.e., it is positive but still not significant. Moreover, there is some evidence of a positive effect on fiscal balances when considering the disaggregated asset price series (Table 21 ). However, the coefficient estimates are still not significant.
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[Tables 18-21 around here] One possible explanation for the different sign in the revenue responses in the two sub-samples has to do with the fact that in the first sub-sample the correlation between the economic and asset price cycles was much higher than in the second one, as we can see in Tables 22-23 (see figures in bold). Therefore, cyclically adjusted revenues are clean of any asset price effects in the first period. Whereas this might not be the case in the second sub-sample, and that is why we observe a positive (but insignificant) coefficient estimate. 3 It worth noting that according to the findings in Tables 10-13, fiscal policy was countercyclical (positive output gap coefficient) in 1970-1992 and turned pro-cyclical (negative output gap coefficient) in the period 1993-2005. Hence, the whole sample findings are driven by those in the first sub-sample. 4 The response of government spending to economic activity switches sign, it is positive (pro-cyclical) in the first period (as in the whole sample case) and negative (counter-cyclical) in the second. However, in both periods it is insignificant. 5 It should be highlighted that in the first sub-sample government revenues respond positively to output gap (pro-cyclical response) as in the whole sample case, whereas in the second sub-sample they respond negatively, i.e. they exhibit a counter-cyclical response.
[ Tables 22 and 23 around here]
Main findings
Overall, the results indicate that the whole sample findings are mainly driven by the fiscal policy responses in the period 1970-1992, both in the case of the overall fiscal balance, and in the case of government spending and government revenue reaction functions. In the latter period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the effects of asset prices are either much weaker (as in the case of fiscal balances and government spending) or have opposite sign (as in the case of government revenues) compared to the whole sample case. This is also attributed to the fact that economic activity and asset prices cycles appear to have lower correlation in the second sub-period, altering, in particular, the behaviour of cyclically adjusted revenues. Thus, this gauges in favour of adjusting government revenues for asset price changes, because of the "decoupling" of economic and asset price cycles since the early 1990s.
6 One additional reason for that has to do with the fact that while the volatility of economic activity cycles has fallen over the course of the years (either due to better policies or to smaller shocks), the volatility of aggregate asset price movements appears to have increased. 
Asset price volatility and fiscal policy
Based on the evidence that asset price volatility has been increasing over the course of the years, we examine whether this had any significant impact on the volatility of fiscal policy stance, as measured by the standard deviation of cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP. Next we repeat the same exercise for the government spending and government revenue variables considered before.
In principle we want to investigate whether asset price volatility amplifies the volatility of the discretionary fiscal policy stance. Hence, we would have to consider a cross section rather than a panel data set, i.e., to have one data point per country. Given that our analysis involves only 17 countries, we split the sample in four parts, 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2005 and construct volatility measures and average values for the respective variables and sub-samples. Therefore, our unbalanced panel involves at the maximum 68 data points.
This section builds on earlier work by Fatas and Mihov (2003) . The dependent variable is the log of the standard deviation of cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP. The key explanatory variables are the log of the standard deviation of the change in aggregate asset prices and the log of the standard deviation of the real GDP growth. An alternative formulation involves the logs of the standard deviation of the disaggregated asset prices series, i.e., the change in real commercial, real residential and real equity prices. The additional control variables are the average value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP and the average 6 Of course each tax revenue component is affected by a different asset price class, so this adjustment should be done at a disaggregated level. 7 The standard deviation of output gap (real GDP growth) has fallen from 2.465 (0.024) in 1970-1992 to 2.149 (0.018) in 1993-2005, while standard deviation of the change in aggregate asset prices series has increased from 0.085 in 1970-1992 to 0.110 in 1993-2005 . Splitting the sample in four sub-samples we see that the standard deviation of the output gap (real GDP growth) was 1.946 (0.025) in 1970-1979, 2.389 (0.018) in 1980-1989, 2.635 (0.025) in 1990-1999 and 1.508 (0.015) in 2000-2005, i .e. the volatility of economic activity has declined over the recent years. However, in the case of the change in aggregate asset price series the standard deviation was 0.081 in 1970-79, 0.084 in 1980-89, 0.088 in 1990-99 and 0.141 in 2000-2005, i .e. it has been increasing. value of the debt ratio. These variables control for initial budgetary conditions. An alternative specification includes the average value of the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP and controls for the government size and the role that the government might have in stabilizing the economy via discretionary fiscal policy (see Gali, 1994; Fatas and Mihov, 2003) . Following Rodrick (1998) and Fatas and Mihov (2003) we include the ratio of imports and exports as a percent to GDP (Trade) to control for the fact that a higher degree of openness might induce governments to use more actively fiscal policy in order to stabilize their economies. Finally, we include the real short term interest rate (RIRS) to control for monetary conditions.
Instead of the average value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP, the government spending and government revenue specifications include, respectively, the average values of the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP and the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a percent of GDP.
Two specifications are considered each time, one with the contemporaneous value of the volatility of real GDP growth and a second one where we instrument the contemporaneous volatility of real GDP growth with its lagged value and the lagged value of the standard deviation of output gap. The second specification controls for the fact that some of the variation in the volatility of the cyclically adjusted fiscal policy variable might still be due to output volatility and not to discretionary policy.
The results presented in Table 24 indicate that higher asset price volatility translates into higher volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Since both variables are in logs, the coefficients report the elasticity of the volatility of discretionary policy with respect to the asset price. Hence, a 1 percent increase in aggregate asset price volatility leads to a 0.16 percent to 0.27 percent increase in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. This finding is reaffirmed in Table 25 in the case of residential and equity prices, with the effect of the volatility of residential prices being more significant (a 1 percent increase in residential price volatility leads to a 0.15 percent to 0.22 percent increase in the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy). On the other hand, real commercial prices have a negative, but insignificant, effect on the volatility of fiscal policy stance. Moreover, an increase in output volatility has no significant effect on the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy.
Turning to the other control variables, we see there is significant evidence that openness as well as higher interest rates increase the volatility of fiscal policy (Tables  24 and 25 ). Higher primary surpluses or lower deficits lead to less volatile fiscal policy outcomes (Tables 24 and 25 ). The proxy of government size enters with a positive coefficient estimate (but it is significant only in Table 25 ), implying a more active use of fiscal policy for stabilizing purposes and, thus, more volatile discretionary fiscal policy outcomes.
[ Tables 24 and 25 around here] As reported in Tables 26 and 27 , there is evidence at the disaggregated level that higher volatility in real residential prices induces more volatile government spending outcomes (a 1 percent increase in residential price volatility leads to about 0.22 percent increase in the volatility of government spending), while there is much weaker evidence in the case of government revenues. Increased equity price volatility amplifies the volatility of government revenues; a 1 percent increase in equity price volatility leads to about 0.37 increase in the volatility of government revenues. Output volatility has a positive effect on the volatility fiscal policy, though the effect is not significant. The bigger the government size the more volatile government spending is, which implies a more active stabilizing role for fiscal policy. More open economies have to cope with more volatile government revenues. Finally, there is some evidence that a higher debt ratio is linked with less volatile government spending.
[ Tables 26 and 27 around here] Overall, there is significant evidence that asset price volatility affects in a positive and significant manner the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Higher residential price volatility leads to more volatile government spending and, thus, to more volatile discretionary fiscal policy stance. Equity price volatility affects the volatility of fiscal policy stance, primarily via the channel of government revenues. On the other hand, output volatility has no particular effect on the volatility of fiscal policy stance. Openness and government size affect in a positive and significant manner the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy; the first primarily through the revenue channel and the other through government spending.
Fiscal adjustments and asset price movements
In this section we examine whether real asset prices affect the probability to initiate or to succeed in a fiscal adjustment effort. To this end we use both the real aggregate asset price index and its three subcomponents, real residential, real commercial and real equity prices. One could expect that an increase in asset prices would generate additional government revenues contributing positively to the initiation of a consolidation effort. However, given that asset prices are very volatile and that the windfall revenues they generate are hardly persistent, it is likely that the improvement in fiscal balances will not be sustainable, i.e., the consolidation effort might not be successful. Alternatively, a fall in asset prices might lead to additional spending on the part of the government as a way to stabilize the financial system and to boost economic activity.
Note that the determinants of successful fiscal adjustments have been discussed extensively in the literature. The composition of the stabilization effort was found to be very important, with fiscal consolidations based on expenditure cuts having more chances to succeed rather than those based on tax hikes (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 1998). The size and persistence of fiscal consolidation were identified as quite significant determinants of adjustment efforts (Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, 1996; Ardagna 2004; Alesina and Ardagna 1998 (2000), Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) , Alesina and Perotti (1995) . 9 We use the terms "fiscal adjustments", "fiscal consolidations" and "fiscal stabilizations" interchangeably. All refer to an improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) by at Tagkalakis (2009) finds that labor and product market institutions can affect the likelihood of initiating and of successfully concluding a fiscal adjustment. The OECD (2007) and the European Commission (2007b) have shown that fiscal rules and budgetary procedures contribute significantly to the success of a fiscal adjustment. Alesina et al. (2006) have shown that the likelihood of successfully concluding a fiscal consolidation increases in case of newly elected governments and in presidential systems where the government in office has a large margin of majority. Tavares (2004) finds that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments, because these actions signal commitment to undertake the adjustment in ways that are not favored by their constituencies. Alesina and Perotti (1995) have shown that single party governments are more likely to succeed in a fiscal consolidation program compared to coalition governments.
The probability of starting a fiscal consolidation
Using data for 17 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2005, this section analyzes the effect of asset prices on the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment. Following Tavares (2004) and Tagkalakis (2009), we define as a fiscal consolidation the increase in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) by at least 1.5% of GDP in a single period.
Control variables
To control for the role played by initial conditions, we consider the effect that the lagged output gap has on the probability to initiate a fiscal consolidation. One could expect that a fiscal adjustment is more likely in better economic times (von Hagen and Strauch 2001) . 10 Turning to the budgetary conditions prior to the consolidation episode, the higher is the cyclically adjusted primary deficit (or the lower is the surplus -CAPBY) and the debt to GDP ratio (Debt), the more pressing the need to correct fiscal imbalances. Following Lambertini and Tavares (2005) we control for monetary and exchange rate conditions. We use the lagged value of the log of the real effective exchange rate (Reer) and the lagged value of the real short term interest rate (RIRS). Exchange rate depreciation and monetary easing can boost economic activity, facilitating the initiation of a fiscal consolidation effort.
We take also into account the following political variables: (i) ideology, which is based on information on left party cabinet portfolios as a percent of all cabinet portfolios, (ii) the margin of majority, that is the fraction of seats held by the government in the parliament. (iii) Years in office, that is how many years has the chief executive in office. (iv) Elections in the year prior to the adjustment episode. (v) Government fractionalization; which is the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. One might expect that sharp fiscal adjustments are more likely to be initiated by left-wing least 1.5% of GDP in a single period (Tavares, 2004) . This adjustment will be successful if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) does not deteriorate three years after the end of the fiscal consolidation (Lambertini and Tavares, 2005) .governments, possibly because of their ability to build a broader social consensus.
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The adjustment could be more likely when the government in office has a strong majority in parliament and when it does not have many years in office, so that it is not affected by stabilization fatigue. Fiscal stabilizations are less likely to be initiated at times of elections; instead, it is more likely to start after elections. Finally, government fractionalization is expected, as shown by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) , to lead to additional spending, implying that coalition governments lack the discipline and the power required to engage in ambitious fiscal consolidation.
Estimation
Our starting point is a specification which includes all political variables and where we use the change in real aggregate asset price (DRAAP) ( Table 28 , column 1). Focusing on the variable of interest, we see that a pick up in real aggregate asset prices increases the likelihood to start a fiscal consolidation. This result is confirmed in column 2 where we discard most of the political variables (except years in office) because they are statistically insignificant. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in the change of real aggregate asset prices increases the likelihood to initiate a fiscal consolidation by about 3.7% (in column 2) to 4.6% (in column 1).
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As we have discussed above asset prices movements have a direct effect on the budget via certain revenue categories. This could imply that the improvement in fiscal balances is somehow automatic and not necessarily driven by the decision of the policy maker to capitalize on this positive development and pursue ambitious fiscal adjustment. Alternatively, the timing of the fiscal impact might depend on the presence of collection lags. To control for this, we use the lagged value of the change in the real aggregate asset prices in columns 3 and 4 of Table 28. Both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the relevant coefficient estimates have diminished. However, we still obtain statistically significant results in column 4, but now a one standard deviation increase in the lagged value of DRAAP raises the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment by only 1.6%.
13 , 14 11 However, Tavares (2004) has shown that right-wing and left-wing governments do not have different effects. Instead, what matters is the intention of the two poles of the political spectrum to build credibility by engaging in policies which are not favored by their constituencies, i.e., the right-wing parties increase taxes and the left-wing parties cut spending. 12 The main emphasis is on the qualitative aspect of the results; however, the way to read these findings is to multiply the standard deviations of all variables (see Table 34 ) with the respective coefficient estimate (e.g. in case of DRAAP it is 0.0973234). The reader should take into account that some of the political variables are indices, so we can just examine the effect of an incremental change in the index considered. 13 The standard deviation of the lagged value of DRAAP is 0.0976484. 14 Given the fact that the role of asset prices is at the heart of this study, we only briefly summarize the findings referring to the control variables. As reported in Table 28 the higher is the cyclically adjusted primary deficit in t-1 (or the lower is the surplus) the greater the probability of a fiscal adjustment at time t. This is in line with other studies (OECD, 2007; Tagkalakis, 2009 ). The higher is the debt ratio the bigger the chances for an adjustment to take place in the next period. Good economic conditions as indicated by a positive output gap have a positive but not statistically significant coefficient estimate. Real exchange rate depreciation (a fall in Reer) makes more likely the initiation of a fiscal adjustment in the coming period (as in Lambertini and Tavares 2005 and Tagkalakis 2009), because it is expected to boost economic activity. A monetary easing (lower real interest) does not affect the probability of initiating a fiscal consolidation. The coefficient estimates of the variables that control for political conditions are insignificant, except of the one capturing how many years has the chief executive in office. As was expected, if the government is in office for many years then the probability to start a fiscal adjustment diminishes dramatically, possibly because of stabilization fatigue.
Next we use the disaggregated asset price series; these are change in real commercial prices (DRCP), real residential prices (DRRP), and real equity prices (DREP). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 29 report the findings when we use their contemporaneous values. All of them appear to have a positive effect on the probability to initiate a fiscal adjustment; however, the effect is highly statistically significant only in the case of the real equity prices. Therefore, it is primarily real equity prices and to a second degree real residential prices that drive the results of the aggregate asset price index.
Turning to the alternative specification with the lagged values of the disaggregated asset price series, we see that (columns 3 and 4 of Table 29 ) it is real residential prices that primarily contribute positively to the probability of initiating a fiscal adjustment. The coefficient estimates of real commercial and equity prices are insignificant and at times negative.
All in all, there are indications that it is mostly increases in real residential and real equity prices that contribute positively to the likelihood of initiating a fiscal adjustment. This should have been expected given the importance of stamp duty taxes, property taxes, and the fact that in most cases capital gains (including from equity) are treated as income liable to personal income tax.
[ Tables 28 and 29 around here]
The determinants of a successful fiscal consolidation
In defining a successful fiscal consolidation we follow previous studies e.g., Lambertini and Tavares (2005) and Tagkalakis (2009). A sharp fiscal consolidation at time t is considered to be successful if the cyclically adjusted primary balance (surplus) does not deteriorate three years after the end of the fiscal consolidation (at time t+3) i.e. CAPBY t+3 ≥CAPBY t . Note that reverse causation is avoided by using a dependent variable which depends on information available 3 years in the future, while the independent variables are measured at the time of or before the adjustment episode (Tavares, 2004) .
Moreover, in line with Ardagna (2004), we incorporate information from countryyears in which fiscal discipline is a problem but governments do not undertake substantial fiscal adjustments. This information is valuable and will be lost if we include only those episodes in which there is evidence of large fiscal adjustments. In line with earlier work on the field (e.g., Tavares, 2004; Ardagna, 2004) we control for the effects that the size and the composition of fiscal consolidation have on the probability of success. 
Estimation
The baseline specifications presented in Table 30 (columns 1-3) indicate that the change in the real aggregate asset prices does not affect in a significant manner the probability of success. This finding holds even if we discard the insignificant political variables (Table 31 , columns 1-3). However, both the magnitude and the sign of the coefficient estimate depend on the control variable used (size and composition). Hence, the evidence obtained so far suggests that although asset prices increases generate windfall tax revenues, these are not persistent and are likely to be reverted in the near future (when asset prices fall), working against a sustainable improvement of fiscal balances.
[ Tables 30-31 around here]
Turning now to the disaggregated asset price series we get a more complex picture. As reported in Tables 32 and 33 the change in the real equity prices contributes positively to the fiscal consolidation objective. This implies that higher real equity prices improve significantly the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation; with their effect working through higher capital gains taxes and/or wealth effects which lead to higher consumption and higher indirect tax revenues. On top of that, there is an indication that an increase in real residential prices (Table 32 , column 1), if anything reduces the likelihood of success. The same applies for real commercial prices but its coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.
[ Table 32 -33 around here]
Overall, although we can say that asset price movements and the tax revenue changes they entail can contribute positively to the consolidation effort, it is unlikely that they will contribute to a sustainable correction in fiscal imbalances. A more disaggregated look confirms this finding both for real residential and real commercial prices. On the contrary, increases in real equity prices by affecting certain tax revenue components contribute both to the initiation and the successful conclusion of a fiscal consolidation program.
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Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the links between asset price movements and fiscal policy developments. The objective was to improve our understanding on whether asset price movements had any effect on the conduct of fiscal policy making, and 16 As regards the control variables (see Table 30 ) we conclude that bad initial budgetary conditions increase the probability of success (as in e. The coefficient estimates of all political variables, except government fractionalization, are statistically insignificant. On the contrary, government fractionalization appears to raise the probability of a successful fiscal consolidation. This is however, at odds with what someone might have expected. As has been shown by Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) a fractionalized (coalition) government results in increased spending, which would probably reduce the chances of a sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances. However, one possible explanation could be that coalition governments can build the social consensus required to initiate and succeed in ambitious fiscal consolidation programs.
whether previous evidence suggests that asset price changes should be taken into account.
In order to evaluate whether asset price movements have been taken into account by policy makers, we have estimated standard fiscal policy reaction functions (as in Gali and Perotti, 2003) , augmented with asset price variables. There is evidence that an increase (a fall) in asset prices affects in a positive (negative) and significant manner cyclically adjusted primary balances (the discretionary fiscal policy stance). This is due to government spending, i.e., higher (lower) asset prices lead to lower (higher) spending in cyclically adjusted terms, whereas revenues respond negatively and insignificantly. Therefore, in response to a rapid fall in asset prices the policy maker increases government spending in order to counterbalance the effects of falling asset prices on economic activity and, possibly, to address the vulnerabilities of the financial system.
Taking on board the impact of financial liberalization we considered separately two sub-samples, 1970-1992 and 1993-2005 . Our results point to the fact that the whole sample findings are driven by the fiscal policy responses over the period 1970-1992, both in the case of the overall fiscal policy stance and in the case of government spending and government revenue reaction functions. In the period 1993-2005, the effects of asset price movements are either much weaker (as in the case of fiscal balances and government spending) or have opposite sign (positive sign as in the case of government revenues), compared to the whole sample findings. This is attributed to two facts. First, that economic and asset prices cycles appear to be less correlated over the course of the years, and second that while the volatility of economic cycles has fallen over the course of the years (due to smaller shocks and better policies), the volatility of aggregate asset price movements appears to have increased. This evidence point to a possible "decoupling" of economic and asset price cycles since the early 1990s, which is an argument in favour of adjusting government revenues for asset price changes, as these has become more important over the course of the years.
Based on the evidence that asset prices affect the fiscal policy stance, and that their volatility has been increasing over the course of the years, we investigated whether this had any significant impact on the volatility of the fiscal policy stance. We found that asset price volatility affects in a positive and significant manner the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. Higher residential price volatility amplifies both the volatility of government spending and the volatility the discretionary fiscal policy stance. Equity price volatility increases the volatility of the fiscal policy stance, primarily via the government revenue channel.
Having established the fact that asset price movements have affected the fiscal policy stance, we then investigated whether they had any significant impact on the decision to consolidate. Our findings indicate that asset price movements (and the tax revenue changes they entail) contribute positively to fiscal consolidation. However, it is unlikely that they will lead to a sustainable correction of fiscal imbalances. This finding is reaffirmed both for residential and commercial prices. On the other hand, increases in equity prices (by affecting specific revenue components e.g., capital gains taxes) contribute positively both to the initiation and the successful conclusion of a fiscal consolidation effort.
Overall, we conclude that fiscal policy makers have been responding to asset price movements. In periods of falling asset prices governments have followed an expansionary fiscal policy stance, via higher government spending as indicated by evidence provided by fiscal policy reaction functions. However, while asset price movements contribute to fiscal consolidation, they do not necessarily lead to successful fiscal consolidation episodes. Nevertheless, fiscal policy makers should taken into account asset price movements because they amplify the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy stance. This is particularly relevant because according to Fatas and Mihov (2003) discretionary fiscal policy, in turn, amplifies business cycle fluctuations and harms economic growth. In addition, in view of the increased asset price volatility and the reduced correlation of economic and asset price cycles over the recent years there is a case for taking into account and responding to asset price movements and for adjusting fiscal balances, and in particular government revenues, for asset price changes.
Macroeconomic variables
The macroeconomic variables used extent from 1970 to 2005. Fiscal and output variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook (2006), the definitions used are: the lagged value of the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (CAPBY), the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance as a percent of GDP (DCAPBY), the lagged value of the debt to GDP ratio (Debt), the lagged value of the output gap (Output gap), the lagged value of the short term real interest rate (RIRS), the change in the primary balance as a share of GDP (Change in primary balance), the change in the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a share of GDP (Change in Spending -DCATDXY), the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a share of GDP (Spending -CATDXY), the change in the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of GDP (Change in Revenue -DCATRY), the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a share of GDP (Revenue -CATRY). We also used the real GDP growth rate and an openness index (TRADE) which was constructed as a ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. The lagged value of the log of the real effective exchange rate (Reer) comes from the AMECO database of the European Commission (2007a).
Asset price variables
Our asset price indicators were kindly provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and have been used in earlier studies like Borio and Lowe (2002) . The main indicator is a measure the change in the log of the annual aggregate real asset prices (DRAAP), which covers 1970-2005 for 17 industrial countries and combines price indices for three asset classes -equities, residential property and commercial property -by weighting the components using shares of the asset classes in private sector wealth. The private consumption deflator is used to convert nominal to real asset prices. In addition, we considered also the change in the log of the three disaggregate asset price indicator, i.e., real commercial prices (DRCP), real residential prices (DRRP) and real equity prices (DREP).
Political variables
The variable "margin of majority" is the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats. The variable "years in office", reports how many years has the chief executive in office. The lagged value of the variable "elections" captures whether there were legislative or executive elections in the year prior to the adjustment episode. The variable "government fractionalization" reflects the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of different parties. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap are its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap are its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap are its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 IV regressions with robust standard errors. The instruments used for output gap were its first and second lag. Country and year dummy variables were used.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Dependent variables: Volatility of the log of the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balances as a percent of GDP. All regressions include an intercept. The p-values in parenthes3s are based on heteroskdastic robust standard errors.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Dependent variables: In columns 1 and 2 is the volatility of the log of the change of the cyclically adjusted total expenditures excluding interest payments as a percent of GDP, in columns 3 and 4 the volatility of the log of the change of the cyclically adjusted total revenues as a percent of GDP . All regressions include an intercept. The p-values in parenthes3s are based on heteroskdastic robust standard errors.. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based on robust, heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. *,**, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Notes: Probit estimates -dependent variable: probability of starting a fiscal adjustment. For each independent variable we report dF/dx, i.e. the marginal change in the probability of initiating an adjustment for average values of the independent variables (the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in the independent variable, or, if the control variable is a dummy variable, a change from 0 to 1 in this variable). In parenthesis we report the t-statistic based Output gap (t-1)
